Penn State Dickinson Law

Dickinson Law IDEAS
Faculty Scholarly Works

Faculty Scholarship

1-1-2005

The Lawyer's Ethical Considerations in Medicaid Planning for the
Elderly: Representing Smith and Jones
Katherine C. Pearson
kcp4@psu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/fac-works

Recommended Citation
Katherine C. Pearson, The Lawyer's Ethical Considerations in Medicaid Planning for the Elderly:
Representing Smith and Jones, 76 Pa. B. Ass'n Q. 1 (2005).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarly Works by an authorized administrator of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For
more information, please contact lja10@psu.edu.

JANUARY 2005

The Lawyer's Ethical
Considerations In Medicaid
Planning For The Elderly:
Representing Smith And Jones
By KATHERINE C. PEARSON*
Professor of Law
The Dickinson School of Law of The Pennsylvania State University
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
1
INTRODUCTION ......................
THE CLASSIC ELDER LAW QUESTION:
3
"WHO IS THE CLIENT?" . ..............
Duty and Scope of Competent
3
Representation ......................
Documenting the Lawyer-Client
3
Relationship ........................
4
Identifying Conflicts of Interest ........
Duties When Dealing with Unrepresented
5
Persons ............................
Anticipating the Potential for Client's
5
Improper Use of Advice ..............
Addressing Client Identification Concerns
6
for Smith and Jones ..................
MEDICAID PLANNING FOR PERSONS
7
WITH DIMINISHED CAPACITY .........
Addressing Capacity Concerns for
8
Smith and Jones .....................
AVAILABILITY OF GUIDANCE ON
PENNSYLVANIA ETHICS QUESTIONS ... 9
9
CONCLUSION ........................
INTRODUCTION
Lawyers who give legal advice on Medicaid
planning encounter significant ethical questions, often with answers that are highly fact
specific.1 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court

recently approved major revisions of Pennsylvania's Rules of Professional Conduct, effective on January 1, 2005. The changes, which
flow from the American Bar Association's
Ethics 2000 Project, provide an appropriate
opportunity for lawyers to reconsider their
ethical obligations. To assist in recognizing

whether the public should be "forced" to shoulder
the financial burdens of the individual. For exam-

ple, in 1997 Congress attempted to criminalize certain Medicaid planning advice about disposition of
assets, but the provision has not been enforced.
Compare 42 U.S.C. §1320a-7b(a)(6) (2003) with New
York State Bar Association v. Reno, 999 F.Supp. 710

(N.D.N.Y. 1998) (granting injunctive relief in favor of
Bar Association on likelihood of irreparable harm to
First Amendment rights through impairment of right
to counsel clients, despite Attorney General's pledge
of non-enforcement) and Magee v. U.S., 93 ESupp
2d 161 (D.RI. 2000) (finding no case or controversy
in light of Attorney General's position that statute
was unconstitutional). In considering whether to
undertake any role as a legal advisor on Medicaid
planning, the lawyer with fundamental doubts
should review the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.2 on "Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority Between Client and
Lawyer" and Rule 2.1 on "Advisor." See also John A.
Miller, Voluntary Impoverishment to Obtain Government Benefits, 13 Cornell J. L. & PuB. PoL'y 81 (Fall

* ©Copyright 2004 Katherine C. Pearson. Special
thanks are due Professor Laurel S. Terry and Visiting
Clinical Professor Keith Noll for their very helpful
comments on an earlier draft. Thanks also to the students and clients at the Elder Law Clinic at Penn
State Dickinson who helped to inspire this article.
I An important ethical dimension to Medicaid
planning, not directly addressed in this article, involves what are arguably political questions, such as

2003) (discussing policy concerns and recommending legislative changes to adopt a "middle way" between welfare that permits or encourages voluntary
impoverishment, and the high public cost of nationalized, uniform health care); A. Frank Johns, Legal
Ethics Applied to Initial Client-Lawyer Engagements
in Which Lawyers Develop Special Needs Pooled
Trusts, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 47 (2002); Timothy
Takacs & David L. McGuffey, Medicaid Planning:
Can It Be Justified? 29 WM. MIICHFLL L. REv. 111
(2002).
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potentially relevant ethical considerations in
Medicaid planning, this article begins with
two basic scenarios.
Scenario A. Mr.and Mrs. Smith make an appointment with Lawyer. Mr. Smith, age 70, has
recently been diagnosed with early stages of
Alzheimer's disease, and Mrs. Smith, age 68,
while mentally healthy, has severe arthritis,
thus compromising her ability to care for her
husband. They have two adult children, who
do not live in the area. The couple has modest
assets, including $800,000 in savings and investments, a home ($250,000 equity), and Mr.
Smith has income in the form of a pension that
pays $4,500 monthly as long as he is alive. At
the meeting, they express concern about maximizing their assets for their own care, while
still leaving money for their children if possible. They express concern that nursing home
care will be inevitable for Mr. Smith, potentially wiping out their savings. They already
have reciprocal wills making each other the
primaryheirs and their two children equal secondary heirs. They are inquiringabout preparation of "powers of attorney," naming son or
daughter as agent, and making provision for
appropriatetransfers or gifts for purposes of
Medicaid planning.
Scenario B. Judy Jones makes an appointment with Lawyerfor advice about her mother,
Mrs. Jones. Judy explains that her mother is a
widow, age 78, who is in the mid-stages of
Alzheimer's disease. Several years ago, priorto
the death of her husband,Mrs. Jones properly
executed a "power of attorney" naming her
daughter as agent. The power of attorney is
general and durable, with specific provision
for the agent to make "unlimited gifts," but no
specific mention of Medicaid planning.2 Judy
recognizes that as her mother's condition is
progressing,she must consider placement in a
nursing home. Judy's adult brother does not
live in the area, Judy currently lives in an
apartmentin the same city as her mother; she
is divorced, has a full time job and a minor

2 Pennsylvania amended its statutory authority for
powers of attorneys, effective December 12, 1999. In
the absence of the grantor's express provision of "unlimited" gifting powers, a grant of gifting authority is
now presumed to be "limited" in scope, closely
linked to the Internal Revenue Codes's annual exclusions for gifting. See 20 Pa.C.S.A. §§5601.2 and
5603. This is a significant departure from Pennsylvania common law. Compare Estate of Reifsneider,
610 A.2d 912 (Pa. 1992).

child. Her mother has a will, making Judy and
her brother equal heirs. In addition to Mrs.
Jones' home ($250,000 equity), her mother has
savings totaling $500,000 and Social Security
in the amount of $3,000 per month. Judy says
that her parents always planned to leave
"something" for Judy, as they recognized that
as a working, single mother, she hasn't yet
been able to buy her own home. Judy wishes
to discuss Medicaid planning to maximize
her mother's assets for long term care and
inheritance.
In each scenario, the likelihood of nursing
home care is high, raising valid questions
about Medicaid planning. In each situation, realistic concern is expressed by family members to the lawyer about exhaustion of personal savings through private payment for
long term care. Careful planning can maximize
the elders' resources so as to better protect the
financial stability for the community spouse or
to better assure an elder's peace of mind on
matters such as estate planning. Medicaid
planning frequently involves some reallocation of the elders' resources or income, thereby
accelerating the date of eligibility for Medicaid. Permissible Medicaid planning may include gifting of some of parent's assets to
children while taking into account the need to
wait for the expiration of any corresponding
period of ineligibility to make an application
for Medicaid
benefits for the parent in need of
3
care.
In the first scenario, involving the Smiths,
any plan for gifting to the children would
likely be tempered by the couple's concern
about protecting the community spouse from
"impoverishment." 4 In the second scenario,
involving the Jones', the concern about spousal
protection does not exist, as the only apparent
heirs are the adult children. In either scenario,
planning requires the informed consent of "the
client" or "clients."

3 See e.g., 42 U.S.C. §1396p(c)(1) (requirement
that each state adopt a Medicaid plan for the treatment of transfers for less than fair market) and 55
PA.CODE §178.104 (discussing ineligibility for
Medical Assistance in Pennsylvania, created by disposition of certain assets for less than fair market
value). Medical Assistance is the term used in
Pennsylvania for Medicaid.
4 See e.g., ROBERT C. GERHARD, PENNSYLVANIA
MEDICAID (Bisel 2004) [hereinafter Pa Medicaid] at
Chapter 3, a thoughtful summary of the history of

"spousal impoverishment" protections at the federal
level.
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While lawful gifting to children may be possible in both scenarios, each scenario poses
unique ethical concerns for the lawyer in deciding whether to recommend or undertake
gifting or other transfers as Medicaid planning
steps. In providing analysis of these scenarios,
this article attempts to identify ethical factors
relevant to the lawyer in providing Medicaid
planning advice. Specific answers are not,
however, offered here, as specific answers depend on facts and subtleties not available in
hypothetical scenarios.
THE CLASSIC ELDER LAW QUESTION:
"WHO IS THE CLIENT?"
In elder law, identification of the "client" (or
"clients") is often both difficult and critical, especially as it is the first step in recognizing potential conflicts of interest for the attorney who
consults with both the elder and the elder person's family members. 5 In the context of
Medicaid planning, ignoring the question of
"who is the client?" may lead the attorney or
the family to make unwarranted assumptions
about appropriate disposition of the elder's assets. The need to identify the client (or clients)
is not represented by any single rule, but,
rather flows from obligations arising under
several rules, as described below.
Duty and Scope of Competent Representation
Under the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.1, governing "Competence," does not require abstract or theoretical
competence of a lawyer, but rather, frames the
lawyer's duty in terms of providing "competent representation to a client." Similarly, Rule
1.2, providing for "Scope of Representation
and Allocation of Authority Between Client
and Lawyer," discusses the lawyer's obligation, within limits, to "abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation." (Emphasis added to each provision.)
These two rules are a starting place for recognition of an obligation to identify "the client."

Documenting the Lawyer-Client Relationship
Under the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct, for new or non-regular attorneyclient relationships, the lawyer is obligated to
provide written communication of the fee
agreement to the client. Again, this emphasizes a need for identification of the "client" or
"clients." Rule 1.5 (b) on "Fees," specifies that
"when the lawyer has not regularly represented the client, the basis or rate of the fee
shall be communicated to the client, in writing, before or within a reasonable time after
commencing the representation." (Emphasis
added.)
Unlike the Pennsylvania Rule, the ABA
Model rule makes the written communication
on fees "preferred" rather than mandatory.
However, the ABA Model Rule also provides a
more extensive obligation to document the
lawyer-client relationship than does the
Pennsylvania rule. "The scope of representation and the basis or rate of the fee and expense ...shall be communicated to the client,
...
See ABA Model
preferably in writing.
Rules of Professional Conduct 1.5. (Emphasis
added.) Even though written documentation of
the "scope of representation" is not required in
Pennsylvania, it seems a wise practice to follow in order to reduce or avoid disputes about
the job undertaken, particularly where potential conflicts of interest exist.
Engagement letters are typically appropriate
for documenting the commencement of the
lawyer-client relationship, and provide a
means of satisfying the requirement of Rule 1.5
regarding fee communication. 6 Further, using
the engagement letter to identify the "client"or
"clients" seems a logical extension of Pennsylvania's written fee communication requirement and the ABA's recommendation to document the "scope of representation." As the
engagement letter (or retention agreement) is
most appropriately prepared at the outset of
the relationship or the undertaking of a new
matter, the preparation of this document also
serves as an important early reminder to the
attorney to "think through" the issues connected to client identification.

5 See e.g., Jeffrey N. Pennell, Representations
Involving Fiduciai Entities: Who is the Client?, 62
6 See PENNSYLVANIA ETHcs HANDBOOK (Laurel S.
FORDHAM L. REv. 1319 (March 1994) (discussing the
lawyer's ethical dilemmas arising out of trusts and Terry, Aims C. Coney &Thomas G.Wilkinson, eds.,
estates administration). This special issue of Ford- Pa. Bar Inst., rev. vol. 2000) [hereinafter PBI ETHICS
ham Law Review offers several interesting articles HANDBOOK], including a Sample Engagement Letter
at §1.6.
on ethical issues in representing older clients.
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Identifying Conflicts of Interest
Identification of the "client" or "clients" is
also necessary in order to recognize and respond to potential conflicts of interest among
family members who frequently participate in
discussion of Medicaid planning.
The rules regarding "Conflict of Interest"
among clients have been substantially reorganized by the Rules of Professional Conduct as
adopted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
effective in January 2005. Under the old Rule
1.7, there were two classes of conflicts, based
on a determination that the lawyer's representation of one client "will" or "may" be adverse
to another client. New Rule 1.7, eliminates the
"will" or "may" adversity distinction and instead sets forth a preliminary bar on representation of clients with "concurrent conflicts of
interest," unless certain additional protective
steps of analysis and action are satisfied.
New Rule 1.7 on "Conflict of Interest:
Current Clients," provides:
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a
lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of
interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if:
(1) the representation of one client will be
directly adverse to another client; or
(2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities
to another client ... or a third person or by a
personal interest of the lawyer.
(h) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under paragraph
(a), a lawyer may represent a client if.
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the
lawyer will be able to provide competent and
diligent representation to each affected client;
(2) the representation is not prohibited by
law;
(3) the representation does not involve the
assertion of a claim by one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the
same litigation or other proceeding before a
tribunal; and
(4) each affected client gives informed
consent.
(Emphasis added.)
On the one hand, the new Rule 1.7 appears
to eliminate the "may" standard for dealing
with significant risks of conflict of interest,
that appeared in the old Rule 1.7. On the other
hand, the new Rule 1.7 continues to put the

burden on the lawyer to analyze the potential
for a conflict to arise, to analyze candidly the
lawyer's own potential for conflicting loyalties
or susceptibility to competing interests, and to
seek "informed consent" of all affected clients.
As noted in Comment 14 to new Rule 1.7,
"[wihen the lawyer is representing more than
one client, the question of consentability must
be resolved as to each client." In any simultaneous representation of multiple clients, the
lawyer must be highly self-aware in order to
resist subtle pressures or temptations to
favor one client's position, especially to the
detriment of a less visible or less communicative client. Where there are persons with acknowledged impairments to their capacity, the
opportunity to gain truly "informed" consent
regarding conflicts is, at best, limited.
The commentary to new Rule 1.7 emphasizes the need to identify clearly "the client" or
"clients," in order to also identify and resolve
any conflict, noting the potential for both a
pre-representation agreement conflict or one
that arises later.7
A conflict of interest may also arise from the
terms for payment of the lawyer. As noted in
Comment 13 to new Rule 1.7, "A lawyer may
be paid from a source other than the client, including a co-client, if the client is informed of
that fact and consents and the arrangement
does not compromise the lawyer's duty of loyalty or independent judgment to the client."
Rule 1.8, newly titled as "Conflict of Interest:
Current Clients: Specific Rules," continues
to prohibit the lawyer from accepting third
person compensation unless "the client gives
informed consent."

I Comment 2 to new Rule 1.7 provides: "Resolution of a conflict of interest problem under this Rule
requires the lawyer to: 1) clearly identify the client
or clients; 2) determine whether a conflict of interest
exists; 3) decide whether the representation may be
undertaken despite the existence of a conflict, i.e.,
whether the conflict is consentable; and 4) if so, consult with the clients affected under paragraph (a) and
obtain their informed consent ...." Further, if the
conflict arises after the representation has already
begun, "the lawyer ordinarily must withdraw from
the representation, unless the lawyer has obtained
the informed consent of the client..." Comment 4
to new Rule 1.7 (emphasis added).
8In addition to the obligation to seek the informed
consent of a client whose fees are paid by another,
the lawyer must establish the ground rules for the
payer's noninterference with the lawyer-client relationship and the lawyer's role as independent advice
giver, and the lawyer must establish the means by
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Duties When Dealing with Unrepresented
Persons
Even if the lawyer takes the position that he
or she is representing only one of the persons
who is affected by the legal advice about
Medicaid planning, the lawyer should not
ignore the other, "unrepresented" person's
possible reliance on the lawyer's advice.
Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct,
Rule 4.3(b) on "Dealing with Unrepresented
Persons," in pertinent part, provides:
[D]uring the course of a lawyer's representation of a client, a lawyer shall not give advice
to a person who is not represented by a
lawyer, other than the advice to secure counsel, if the lawyer knows or reasonably should
know the interests of such person are or have
a reasonable possibility of being in conflict
with the interests of the lawyer's client.
(Emphasis added.) The cormmentary recognizes that the lawyer may prepare documents
that require the unrepresented third person's
signature, but the lawyer should clearly state
that he or she is not disinterested when seeking the unrepresented third party's signature. 9
This rule, often overlooked by practicing
lawyers, establishes a potentially fine line between the lawyer's frequent role in giving "instructions" to a third party, versus giving legal
advice to a third person who is acting as an
agent for the client. In Medicaid planning, frequently the lawyer may view his or her representation as running only to the elder, but the
instructions given to the elder's agent, if the
agent is unrepresented, creates a situation that

which the client's confidential concerns are protected. See new Rule 1.8(f), including the cross reference to Rule 1.6 on Confidentiality of Information.
See also Rule 5.4 on "Professional Independence of
a Lawyer," and especially subsection (c) providing
that the "lawyer shall not permit a person who...
employs or pays the lawyer to render legal services
for another to direct or regulate the lawyer's professional judgment .. "
9 "Whether a lawyer is giving impermissible advice may depend on the experience and sophistication of the unrepresented person, as well as the setting in which the behavior and comments occur...
So long as the lawyer has explained that the lawyer
represents an adverse party and is not representing
the person, the lawyer may . . . prepare documents

that require the person's signature and explain the
lawyer's own view of the meaning of the document
or the lawyer's view of the underlying legal obligations." Comment 2 to Rule 4.3 (as amended effective
January 1, 2005) (emphasis added).

triggers the concerns of Rule 4.3 (b). 1 0 Again,
the engagement letter may be the appropriate
place to document the lawyer's role in making
statements to the unrepresented agent, perhaps offering a paragraph to specify the "nonengagement" of the lawyer as the agent's "personal lawyer."
Anticipating the Potentialfor Client's
Improper Use of Advice
Several rules highlight the unique role of the
lawyer as an advisor on both uses and abuses
of the law, including the potential need for
caution in giving advice that a client may misuse in ways that constitute a crime or fraud.
For example, Rule 1.2 (d), in its revised form,
continues to recognize the sometimes fine line
between advice that assists a client in engaging
in conduct the lawyer "knows is criminal or
fraudulent," and advice or counsel that makes
"a good faith effort to determine the validity,
scope, meaning or application of the law."1
This distinction becomes particularly important for the lawyer dealing with a family member or other agent of the elder, when counseling about the alternatives for asset use or
preservation. 12 The commentary to Rule 4.1 on
"Truthfulness in Statements to Others," observes that "[olrdinarily, a lawyer can avoid
assisting a client's crime or fraud by withdrawing from the representation." Sometimes,

10 "For example, a lawyer representing the lender
at a real estate closing should inform all parties that
the lawyer represents only the lender and cannot offer anyone else advice regarding the transaction.
Other than to advise an unrepresented party to consult counsel, the lawyer should not give advice if
there isa reasonable possibility that the interests of
the unrepresented party conflict with those of the
lawyer's client." (PBI ETMcs HANDBOOK, supra note 6
at §8.5.)
11See also Rule 8.4 on "Misconduct," including
(c) describing the professional misconduct of a
lawyer who "engage[s] in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation."
12 Although not involving allegations of a lawyer's
role or misconduct, the recent "Bertha Trout" case in
central Pennsylvania, vividly demonstrates the potential for trusted family members to misuse powers
of attorney. A great-niece and her husband were convicted of theft and conversion of more than $600,000
of the elder's assets using a power of attorney; fortunately, the 100 year old aunt was able to testify at
trial about the misuse of authority. See Matt Miller,
Couple Found Guilty of Theft from Relative, PAuOTNEWS, Sept. 20, 2003, at B1, available at 2003 WL
3218137.
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a so-called "noisy" withdrawal is necessary, in
the "extreme" case where a lawyer may have a
duty "to disclose information relating to the
representation to avoid being deemed to have
assisted the client's crime or fraud." (Comment
3 to Rule 4.1.) The level of noise appropriate
for prevention of serious misconduct affecting
the person with diminished capacity is also a
matter for consideration under Rule 1.14, addressed below.
Addressing Client Identification Concernsfor
Smith and Jones
Keeping in mind the above discussion of
key Rules of Professional Conduct, and returning to our two hypothetical scenarios, a
cautious attorney will identify clearly the designated "client" or "clients," using the engagement letter for documenting the relationship.
Despite the lack of an affirmative Pennsylvania
rule-based obligation to specify the "scope of
representation" in addition to basis or rate of
the fee, the cautious lawyer will include at
least some details about the scope of the matters undertaken at the outset of the representation, with written updates of the scope of representation as appropriate during the course of
the representation.
Under Scenario A, it appears that both Mr.
and Mrs. Smith are approaching the lawyer as
joint clients. From the brief hypothetical, it
initially appears there is no "direct" adversity,
addressed in Rule 1.7(a)(1). However, the cautious lawyer will recognize that Mr. and Mrs.
Smith's interests in the outcome of any
Medicaid planning may not be identical, thus
triggering the risk that the lawyer's responsibilities to one client may be impacted by the
desires of the other client, thus implicating
Rule 1.7(a)(2) and the lawyer's responsive
steps under Rule 1.7(b)(1) through (4).
The cautious lawyer will consult individually with both Mr. and Mrs. Smith to determine each spouse's separate understanding of
the possible risks of dual representation
should a dispute arise. Further, the cautious
lawyer will communicate at the outset of representation the lawyer's obligation to withdraw from representation of both Mr. and Mrs.
Smith should a conflict of interest arise and if
either spouse declines (or is unable) to waive
the conflict of interest. While the gifting of
their joint assets will reduce the assets available to pay for care for either Mr. Smith or Mrs.
Smith as "private pay" patients, the key question is whether each recognizes the consequences. Are they in agreement about the plan

to allocate the money first to the "community
spouse," and to the extent not used by the
community spouse, to the children in the form
of inheritance? As long as both spouses understand the goals, the risks of this plan, and are
in agreement about the gifting plan or plans,
there appears to be no "concurrent conflict of
interest." Nonetheless, the cautious lawyer
will document each client's informed consent
to the joint representation, consistent with the
final step of Rule 1.7 (b)(4).
Under Scenario B, there are three possible
answers for the question of "who is the
client?" The client may be Daughter Judy
Jones. Or, the client may be Mrs. Jones, with
daughter Judy Jones acting as her authorized
agent in securing representation. Or, both Judy
and Mrs. Jones may be the clients. It appears
that without the lawyer's careful articulation
of the identity of a joint representation or of
the individual representation of either Judy
Jones or Mrs. Jones as the sole client, Judy may
assume that she is the client and would
thereby assume she is entitled to rely on a confidential relationship with the lawyer in seeking advice.
In the Jones' scenario, the cautious lawyer
will recognize that representation of either
Judy Jones, Mrs. Jones, or both is fraught with
a potential for "concurrent conflict of interest"
or future "conflict of interest," whether it
arises from "direct adversity," subtle pressures
from daughter, or later complaints from the
son, either on his own behalf or on behalf of
his mother. While the daughter is offering a
"power of attorney" that appears to be duly executed and appropriately broad in granting her
the authority to make gifts, the daughter's plan
for gifting appears at least in part to be selfmotivated. Again, "informed consent" as to
this conflict can be used as a basis for waiver
of the conflict of interest, but seeking the consent of appropriate persons is potentially more
challenging here than with the Smith couple.
If the lawyer determines he or she is representing both Mrs. Jones and the daughter, the
lawyer must decide how to handle the "informed consent" required for waiver of any
conflict of interest, as required by Rule 1.7. If
the lawyer determines he or she is representing "only" Mrs. Jones, while viewing daughter
as "only" the agent, the obligations of Rules 1.7
and 4.3 appear to require careful explanation
to Judy of this limited representational role.
Further, there is a question of the mother's capacity to make decisions for herself, thus triggering additional considerations under new
Rule 1.14, regarding "Clients with Diminished
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Capacity," discussed below. Even if the lawyer
determines that he or she is representing
"only" the daughter, the lawyer may still have
significant obligations to Mrs. Jones as a vulnerable ward or principal, also as recognized
in Rule 1.14 and emphasized by the comments
to Rule 1.14. Thus, any answer to the question
about "who is the client?" may be strongly impacted by the diminished, or diminishing
capacity of Mrs. Jones.
MEDICAID PLANNING FOR PERSONS
WITH DIMINISHED CAPACITY
In the first scenario, Mr. Smith is in the early
stages of a dementing illness, but appears to
demonstrate adequate understanding of the future of the illness, his need for formal care, and
the impact of any Medicaid planning on his future care. In the second scenario, Mrs. Jones
did not participate in the original request for
Medicaid planning, and as explained by her
daughter, is already experiencing difficulty in
taking care of herself. The Rules of Professional Conduct require the lawyer to make distinctions based on assessment of the individual client's capacity. The individual's ability to
provide "informed consent" to the plan (or to
release any conflict of interest created by the
plan) is fact specific.
Under the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct, as amended, "informed consent"is defined as "the consent by a person to
a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer
has communicated adequate information and
explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed
course of conduct." (See the new provisions of
Rule 1.0 on "Terminology.") Obviously, the
ability of the person to provide consent will be
affected by the individual's level of capacity.
Rule 1.14, which used to be titled "Client
under a Disability," and is now titled "Client
with Diminished Capacity," provides:
(a) When a client's capacity to make adequately considered decisions in connection
with a representation is diminished, whether
because of minority, mental impairment or for
some other reason, the lawyer shall, as far as
reasonably possible, maintain a normal
client-lawyer relationship with the client.
(b) When the lawyer reasonably believes
that the client has diminished capacity,'is at
risk of substantial physical, financial or other
harm unless action is taken and cannot adequately act in the client's own interest, the
lawyer may take reasonably necessary protective action, including consulting with indi-

viduals or entities that have the ability to take
action to protect the client and, in appropriate
cases, seeking the appointment of a guardian
ad litem, conservator or guardian.
(c) Information related to the representation of a client with diminished capacity is
protected by Rule 1.6 [related to "Confidentiality of Information"]. When taking protective action pursuant to paragraph (b), the
lawyer is impliedly authorized under Rule
1.6(a) to reveal information about the client,
but only to the extent reasonably necessary to
protect the client's interests.

The first paragraph of Rule 1.14 can be characterized as imposing the obligation to "maintain a near-normal lawyer-client relationship,"
while the second paragraph authorizes the
lawyer to initiate appropriate protective action
for the incapacitated client at risk, and the
third paragraph permits limited waivers of
confidentiality to effectuate appropriate protective action.
The commentary to new Rule 1.14 is extensive. The comments emphasize that the elderly may "be quite capable of handling routine financial matters while needing special
legal protection concerning major transactions." (Comment 1 to Rule 1.14.) Even where
an agent, guardian, or other "legal representative" exists, the lawyer "should as far as possible accord the represented person the status of
client, particularly in maintaining communication." (Comment 2.)
While the comments recognize the potential
for frequent involvement of family members in
discussions with the lawyer, the comment cautions the lawyer to look to keep the "[impaired] client's interests foremost," and to look
to the client and not the family members for
major decisions about the client. (Comment 3.)
Where there is an agent, guardian or "legal
representative," the lawyer "should ordinarily
look to the representative for decisions on behalf of the client." (Comment 4 to Rule 1.14.)
However, even where "the lawyer represents
the guardian as distinct from the ward" if the
lawyer becomes "aware that the guardian is
acting adversely to the ward's interest, the
lawyer may have an obligation to prevent or
rectify the guardian's misconduct." Comment
4 to Rule 1.14 also cross references Rule 1.2(d),
which provides that the "lawyer shall not
counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in
conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or
fraudulent ....
Comment 11 to Rule 1.2 further states that "[w]here the client is a fiduciary, the lawyer may be charged with special
obligations in dealing with a beneficiary."
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Thus, even though a lawyer may initially take
the position that he or she is representing
"only" the agent, thus believing that Rule 1.14
for an incapacitated "client" is not triggered,
the cautious lawyer will give careful consideration of the context of Rule 1.14, its commentary, and related rules, and thereby recognize a
separate obligation may still exist requiring the
lawyer to consider the impact of the clientagent's actions on the "ward" or "principal" or
"beneficiary."
In determining capacity to consult, Comment 6 to Rule 1.14 provides guidance, noting
the lawyer is expected to take into account a
number of facts including "the client's ability
to articulate reasoning leading to a decision[;]
variability of state of mind and ability to appreciate consequences of a decision; the substantive fairness of a decision; and the consistency of a decision with the known long-term
commitments and values of the client." While
medical personnel may have rendered opinions on capacity as a medical matter, the commentary appears to emphasize the lawyer's
role in considering legal capacity, by phrasing
the attorney's use of the medical community in
"may" rather than "shall" language. "In appropriate circumstances, the lawyer may seek
guidance from an appropriate diagnostician."
(Comment 6.)
The commentary to Rule 1.14 further recognizes both the possible benefits and the potential costs of a formal guardianship as opposed
to the use of a power of attorney or an informal
arrangement. "In many circumstances ... appointment of a legal representative may be
more expensive or traumatic for the client than
circumstances in fact require. Evaluation of
such circumstances is a matter entrusted to
the professional judgment of the lawyer."
(Comment 7.)
Addressing Capacity Concernsfor Smith
and Jones
New Rule 1.14 has important implications
for a lawyer engaged in Medicaid planning for
someone who is already experiencing diminished capacity. Returning to the first of the two
scenarios, it appears that Mr. Smith's capacity
is sufficient for him to consult and make an
adequately informed decision on transfer of
assets for purposes of Medicaid planning. If
Medicaid planning is to include future transfers, it may be appropriate for Mr. Smith to
execute a power of attorney expressly authorizing gifts or transfers for the purposes of
Medicaid planning, and to do so well in

advance 13of any eventual deterioration of
capacity.
As the level of capacity diminishes, that person's ability to give "informed consent" to the
plan as a "client" also diminishes. In Scenario
B above, Mrs. Jones' power of attorney permits
gifts, but does not specifically authorize Medicaid planning. Mrs. Jones' will is additional
evidence of her wishes, but it is a post-death
plan, and the plan was to leave any estate
jointly to her two children. It is possible that in
making transfers or gifts of Mrs. Jones' assets,
the daughter's actions may benefit herself or
her brother, but, depending on the availability
of so-called "Medicaid beds" in the area, her
mother's care options may thereby become
more limited. Thus, a number of questions are
raised by any reliance on Mrs. Jones' broad, yet
relatively imprecise power of attorney for
authority to make gifts or transfers as a major
step in Medicaid planning, such as:
" Despite the description by the daughter of
her mother as in the "mid" stages of
Alzheimer's, does the mother have sufficient capacity to participate in any por14
tion of the proposed Medicaid planning?
" Will proposed gifting significantly affect
Mrs. Jones' ability to find an appropriate
nursing home, particularly as the ability
to "private pay" may expand the range for
choices of facilities and thereby help to
secure the more desirable facility for any
eventual Medicaid-financed stay?
" Will the brother, who is not participating
in the meeting, agree with the plan as
falling "within" the scope of his mother's
wishes and/or best interest?
" Is gifting the most appropriate way to
maximize Mrs. Jones' long term care options as compared to other options, such
as exempting a mutual home from estate
recovery where there is a direct caregiver

13 See Jeffrey A. Marshall, Power of Attorney: Key
Issues For Elder Care Planning, 74 PA.B. Ass'N Q.

160 (October 2003) (discussing fiduciary obligations

of agent to principal).
14 See In the Matter of DisciplinaryProceedings
Against John W. Strasburg, 452 N.W. 2d 152 (Wisc.
1990) (suspending attorney who, among other improper actions, failed to meet with elderly "client"
for three weeks after retention by daughter, and who
advised children to transfer money into trust, actions inconsistent with "the client's" wishes and/or
best interest).
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child?' 5 In other words, simplistic gifting
to children may not be the experienced
lawyer's primary recommendation for appropriate Medicaid planning.
The cautious lawyer will make a personal
visit, without the presence of Judy Jones, to
assess Mrs. Jones' capacity either to authorize
Medicaid planning or to waive any conflict of
interest. The lawyer may seek permission to
consult with Mrs. Jones' son as an additional
family member with knowledge of his
mother's wishes. Even if the lawyer determines that the daughter is the only "client,"
the cautious lawyer recognizes that under Rule
1.14 there may be significant obligations to
Mrs. Jones as the incapacitated person, even if
she is viewed only as the "ward" of the clientdaughter. Once additional facts are available,
the lawyer may conclude that "gifting" is not
an appropriate Medicaid step for Mrs. Jones.
AVAILABILITY OF GUIDANCE ON
PENNSYLVANIA ETHICS QUESTIONS
The Pennsylvania Bar Association Committee on Legal Ethics and Professional
Responsibility provides advisory opinions in
response to requests by members of the
Pennsylvania Bar for guidance on ethical concerns. 16 Of particular relevance is a recent informal opinion, addressing the attorney's role
in handling a daughter's plan for gifting, confor her mother,
nected to Medicaid planning
7
using a power of attorney.'
In response to a lawyer's request for advice
in representing a daughter who was attempting to use a durable power of attorney to make
gifts from her 71 year old mother's estate, the
PBA Committee's informal opinion notes that
"[e]ven though Daughter comes to you as a
new client, there are ethical concerns for you

I See e.g., PA MEDICAID, supra note 4 at Section
6.11.
16The Pennsylvania Bar Association's Committee
on Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility can
be contacted by the Ethics Hotline at (800) 932-0311
or by writing to the Committee at Post Office Box
186, Harrisburg, PA 17108, or by fax to (717) 2387182 or by E-mail to http://www.pabar.org. Both a
formal and informal opinion process is available
(with the distinction based on number of committee
members involved in the review) and copies of both
types of opinion are available on Westlaw.
17Informal Opinion Number 2003-31, dated June
8, 2003, available on Westlaw at 2003 WL 23358331.

if Daughter is 8not acting in the best interest of
her Mother. '
Treating the daughter as the primary client
and the mother, who was in a nursing home, as
a "derivative client" under the power of attorney, the opinion warns that "[d]aughter may
have [a]conflict of interest, and hence, you, as
Counsel for Daughter, are also in a conflict situation as what may be financially advantageous for your client, the attorney-in-fact, may
be to the detriment of the Mother, the principal.,"19 The opinion notes the ability of the
lawyer to represent both mother and daughter
may depend on full disclosure and consultation with both clients. Further, the Daughter's
plan to make transfers of her mother's assets in
the form of gifts to herself and grandchildren
"may result in a poorer standard of care for
Mother or expose Mother to claims by Medicaid authorities" and thus may create a conflict of interest under 1.7 and a violation of the
Daughter's fiduciary duties.20 If the mother is
incapacitated, the opinion concludes that the
conflict of interest cannot be waived.
CONCLUSION
A lawyer asked to provide Medicaid planning for a person already experiencing significant capacity issues has a delicate road to
travel. The revision to Rule 1.14 heightens the
lawyer's obligation to the "Mrs. Joneses"
throughout Pennsylvania, whether cast as an
obligation running to Mrs. Jones as "the client"
or to her as the principal, ward or beneficiary
of the "client-agent's" actions. As concerns
about the political correctness of Medicaid
planning increase, so, likely, will the pressures
for lawyers to consider and document their
decisions about "who is the client?," whether
a conflict of interest exists between the family
members involved in Medicaid planning, and
whether the elder has the capacity to make
informed consent for planning or waivers of
conflict of interest.
As seasoned Elder Law attorneys report regularly, the vast majority of family members
seeking Medicaid planning advice do so out of
concern for their frail loved ones, because of
their need for help in the increasingly complicated universe of Medicaid, Medicare and private insurance, and not because of personal

18

Id. at *3.

19Id.
20

Id. at *4.
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greed. When given information about the
available options for Medicaid planning, families frequently select alternatives that cost the
family a higher sum of money, but that also
provide greater peace of mind. Using the revisions to the Rules of Professional Conduct as
additional guidance, lawyers can assist those
most affected in making the most informed
choice possible about long term care. 2

21See also Timothy L. Takacs & David L.
McGuffey, Revisiting the Ethics of Medicaid
Planning, 17 NAT'L AcAD. ELDER L. ATT'Ys Q. 29
(Summer 2004) (noting that frequently clients want

In concluding this article, the author invites
comments from the practicing bar and welcomes samples of "engagement" letters or
retention agreements, particularly those that
address the sensitive issues of client identification for families who seek advice in
Medicaid planning for their elders. The author
hopes to provide further analysis of this topic
in other publications or forums. The ethical
considerations offered here are ever a "work in
progress."

the help of experienced Elder Law Attorneys to navigate "the long-term care maze and [they] do want
Mom to get the best care").

